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Cooperation Between Law Enforcement and State
Hospitals in Warrantless, Nonconsensual Drug
Testing of Maternity Patients is Unconstitutional
Under the Fourth Amendment: Ferguson v. City of
Charleston
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTH AMENDMENT - FREEDOM FROM
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE - SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE -
The United States Supreme Court held that a state hospital's policy
of drug testing maternity patients without their consent, in
conjunction with law enforcement, constitutes an unreasonable
search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution; the state's interest in deterring pregnant women from
drug use does not justify variance from the general rule that official
nonconsensual searches are unconstitutional if not executed
according to and accompanied by a valid search warrant.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)
In April of 1989, a public hospital in Charleston operated by the
Medical University of South Carolina ("MUSC") began performing
drug tests on the urine samples of maternity patients that the staff
suspected of cocaine use.1 This practice was the MUSC staff's
response to the noted increase in cocaine use among maternity
patients at that particular facility, and the nationally perceived
"crack baby" epidemic of the 1980's. 2 Initially, prenatal patients that
tested positive for cocaine use were merely referred to the County
Substance Abuse Commission.
3
The staff noted no decrease in prenatal cocaine use.4 Upset with
the lack of progress, an MUSC obstetrics nurse and an MUSC
attorney contacted the Charleston Solicitor to offer the hospital's
cooperation in efforts to prosecute drug-using mothers-to-be.5 The
1. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 (2001).
2. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70 n.1. At trial, witnesses testified about the "crack baby
epidemic." Id.
3. Id. at 70. The "initial phase" of the testing program lasted approximately four
months. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 70-71. The nurse was Shirley Brown, the obstetrics department case manager
at the Medical University of South Carolina- Id. She was prompted to action by a news story
she heard regarding arrests of drug-using pregnant women in Greenville, South Carolina. Id.
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offer prompted the Solicitor to initiate development of a
cooperative effort whereby the staff of MUSC, the Charleston
police, the County Substance Abuse Commission, and the
Department of Social Services would identify substance-abusing
maternity patients and use the leverage of law enforcement to get
them into treatment and keep them there.
6
Led by the Charleston Solicitor, the vari6us participants created
a written plan for action entitled "Policy M-7." 7 Under Policy M-7,
admitted pregnant patients were scrutinized under nine criteria.
8
Satisfaction of one or more of these criteria subjected the pregnant
patient to a urine screening for cocaine.9 Following the urine test,
Policy M-7 mandated maintenance of a strict chain of custody for
evidentiary purposes. 10 Patients who tested positive were to be
referred to substance abuse treatment and counseling.'1 Refusal of
treatment, missed treatment, or a second positive test resulted in
police notification and subsequent arrest. 2 Finally, Policy M-7
detailed specific offenses with which uncooperative expecting
mothers could be charged, and instructed police to interrogate
those arrested to discover the suppliers of cocaine.' 3 Beyond the
initial prescription of drug treatment, Policy M-7 did not alter
MUSC's prenatal care of mother or child.' 4
The collaboration between MUSC and the authorities continued
for five years. 5 During that period, approximately 253 pregnant
The MUSC attorney she consulted was Joseph C. Good, Jr., and the Charleston Solicitor at
the time was Charles Condon. Id.
6. Id. at 71.
7. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71.
8. Id. These nine criteria appeared in the first section of Policy M-7 entitled
"Identification of Drug Abusers." Id. The nine criteria were: (1) no prenatal care; (2) late
prenatal care after 24 weeks gestation; (3) incomplete prenatal care; (4) abruptio placentae;
(5) intrauterine fetal death; (6) preterm labor of no obvious cause; (7) intrauterine growth
retardation of no obvious cause; (8) previously known drug or alcohol abuse; and (9)
unexplained congenital anomalies. Id. at 71 n.4.
9. Id. at 71.
10. Id. at 71-72. Chain of custody is defined as "[the movement and location of real
evidence from the time it is obtained to the time it is presented in court. The history of a
chattel's possession." BLACK's LAw DicrIoNARY 222 (7th ed. 1999).
11. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72.
12. Id. at 72.
13. Id. at 72-73. If the patient was in her twenty-seventh week of pregnancy or earlier,
Policy M-7 instructed that she be charged with simple cocaine possession. Id. For expectant
mothers in the twenty-eighth week and beyond, there were to be additional charges for
distribution to a person under the age of 18. Id. Finally, if illegal drugs were found in the
patient's system during delivery, she was to be charged with child neglect. Id.
14. Id. at 73.
15. Jean R. Schroedel & Pamela Fiber, Punitive Versus Public Health Oriented
Responses to Drug Use by Pregnant Women, 1 YALE J. OF HEALTH POL'Y, L & EmTics 217, 219
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women tested positive and thirty of those women were arrested.16
Ten of the arrested women brought a three million dollar damages
suit in the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, at Charleston, naming as defendants the City of
Charleston, the trustees of MUSC, and various individual
participants in the implementation of the policy. 7
In their complaint, the arrested mothers challenged the
constitutionality of Policy M-7, alleging that the drug tests it
authorized constituted warrantless, nonconsensual searches by
state officials, for criminal investigatory purposes, in violation of
the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures.18 In response, the hospital and Charleston law
enforcement officials contended that the plaintiffs had, in fact,
consented to the searches, and that even if they had not consented,
the searches were reasonable because they were justified by
special non-law enforcement needs. 19
The district court refused to submit the "special needs" defense
to the jury because of police involvement in the searches (the
searches were not done solely for the benefit of MUSC). 20 The trial
court did submit to the jury the factual question regarding
consent.2' The jury was instructed to decide in favor of the
pregnant women unless they found that the women had in fact
consented.22 The jury found consent and returned a verdict for the
hospital and the law enforcement officials.2 3 The mothers appealed,
contesting the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's
(2001).
16. Brief for the Respondents at 10, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)
(No. 99-936).
17. David C. Brody & Heidee McMillan, Combatting Fetal Substance Abuse and
Governmental Foolhardiness Through Collaborative Linkages, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and Common Sense: Helping Women Help Themselves, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 243, 253
(2001). Nurse Shirley Brown and the Charleston Solicitor were among the named defendants.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F3d 469 (1999).
18. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73. The Fourth Amendment's grant of protection reads: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated..." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
19. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73.
20. Id. at 73-74.
21. Id. at 74.
22. Id. The jury instruction was:
There were no search warrants issued by a magistrate or any other proper judicial
officer to permit these urine screens to be taken. There not being a warrant issued,
they are unreasonable and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, unless
the Defendants have shown by the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence
that the Plaintiffs consented to those searches.
Id. at 74 n.6.




The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed but did not rule on
the consent issue.25 Instead, the court of appeals held that the drug
tests performed by MUSC were reasonable searches as a matter of
law.26 The majority purported to follow a line of United States
Supreme Court cases holding that in extraordinary instances,
"special needs" may justify a warrantless search for
non-law-enforcement purposes.27 The appellate majority deemed the
urine testing to be a "minimal intrusion" on patient privacy, and
found that the health risks and financial burdens sought to be
avoided by the searches qualified as outweighing "special needs."28
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether MUSC's nonconsensual drug testing policy in conjunction
with law enforcement violated the petitioners' Fourth Amendment
rights, and to review the Fourth Circuit's application of the special
needs doctrine.
29
Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion. 0 The Court held
that the Fourth Circuit improperly applied the doctrine of special
needs, and that Policy M-7 was state action in violation of the
petitioners' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches.31
Justice Stevens began by dispensing with some preliminary and
postural matters.32 First, he denoted that the Medical University of
South Carolina is a state hospital, and as such, its employees are to
be considered government actors subject to Fourth Amendment
controls. 3 Second, Justice Stevens confirmed that the MUSC drug
tests were clearly searches as defined by the Fourth Amendment.34
Third, the majority noted that the Court must assume that the tests
were performed without the patients' informed consent because the
district court and the court of appeals both viewed the case as
"one involving MUSC's right to conduct searches without warrants
or probable cause."35
24. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 74.
25. Ferguson, 186 F3d at 469.
26. Id. at 476.
27. Id. at 476-79.
28. Id. at 479.
29. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 528 U.S. 1187 (2000).
30. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id.
31. Id. at 85-86.
32. Id. at 76.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76-77.
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Having dispensed with these preliminary matters, the majority
distinguished Ferguson from four prior cases in which the Court
considered whether similar drug tests fell within what it has called
a "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible
suspicionless searches."36 The majority found the distinguishing
factor to be MUSC's insistence that it had the authority to turn
drug test results over to the police without informing the patients.37
No case had previously sought to justify this type of action.38 In
fact, the Court pointed out that the tests performed in the previous
cases had in fact maintained protections against the disclosure of
results to third parties.
39
Justice Stevens continued the Court's analysis by relaying how in
the previous cases, the special needs which supported
suspicionless drug testing were balanced against the degree of
intrusion into the individuals' privacy.4° The majority found the
intrusion into the privacy of the maternity patients at MUSC to be
far greater than in prior fact patterns. 41 The Court opined that
medical patients have an expectation of privacy different from that
of previous petitioners.42 In addition to finding that the intrusion
was greater and the privacy interest was distinguishable, the Court
found the nature of the purported "special needs" to be less
compelling than in previous cases because the needs were too
closely related to the general interests of law enforcement." The
majority cited this as the factor that truly distinguished the instant
case from others in the "special needs" line."
Justice Stevens held that the weight of the evidence supported
36. Id. at 77 (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997)). The four cases the
Court referred to were Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Treasury Employees v Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989);
and Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), discussed infra. Id.
37. Id. at 77.
38. Id. at 78.
39. Id.
40. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78.
41. Id.
42. Id. In reaching this determination, the Court relied on the amici curiae briefs of
the American Medical Association and the American Public Health Association. Id. "The
reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests
in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel
without her consent." Id.
Amicus Curiae is Latin for "friend of the court" and is defined as a "person who is not a
party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in
the action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter." BLACK'S LAW
DIcnoNARY 83 (7th ed. 1999).
43. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79-80.
44. Id. at 79.
2002
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the conclusion that the primary aims of Policy M-7 were
prosecutorial, not medical.45 In coming to this conclusion, the
majority gave weight to several factors. First, the Court was moved
by the fact that law enforcement was consulted and involved not
only in the implementation or consequences of the policy, but also
was an advocate and indeed an architect of the plan from its very
inception. 46 Second, Policy M-7 itself expended more of its pages
providing for possible criminal charges, police procedures, and
maintenance of a chain of custody than for varied treatment and
additional attempts to wean the pregnant women from cocaine.
47
Third, the police were actively involved, being granted access to
patients' files, and coordinating all moves with the staff of MUSC.
4A
The majority reasoned that though one focus of the program may
have been to cure pregnant women of their cocaine addictions, the
more immediate goal of Policy M-7 was to "generate evidence for
law enforcement purposes."49 Having come to this conclusion, the
Court held that the broad objectives of law enforcement in general
could not serve as the justification for such non-consensual,
warrantless searches because, if held otherwise, virtually all
non-consensual, warrantless searches could be justified, and
therefore constitutional, on such grounds.5° The Court concluded
that such a result would not square with Fourth Amendment
protections. 51 Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgement of the
Fourth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion.
52
Justice Kennedy concurred, reaching the same conclusion but for
45. Id. at 81.
46. Id. at 82. The Court relayed that "throughout the development and application of
the policy, the Charleston prosecutors and police were extensively involved in the day-to-day
administration of the policy." Id.
47. Id. Justice Stevens wrote:
Tellingly, the document codifying the policy incorporates the police's operational
guidelines. It devotes attention to the chain of custody, the range of possible criminal
charges, and the logistics of police notification and arrests. Nowhere, however, does
the document discuss different courses of medical treatment for either mother or
infant, aside from treatment for the mother's addiction.
Id.
48. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82. The majority noted that "[in the course of the policy's
administration, [the police] had access to Nurse Brown's medical files on the women who
tested positive, routinely attended the substance abuse team's meetings, and regularly
received copies of team documents discussing the women's progress." Id.
49. Id. at 82-83.
50. Id. at 84.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 86.
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different reasons.6 The first part of the concurring opinion
disagreed with the majority's position that Policy M-7's immediate
purpose (law enforcement), as opposed to its ultimate purpose
(weaning expectant mothers from drugs), was the appropriate
target for "special needs" examination.5 Kennedy commented that
this approach lacked support in the Court's "special needs"
precedents.5 He suggested that all search policies have an
immediate goal of obtaining evidence, and that all prior cases have
necessarily focused on what the majority deemed to be the
"ultimate goal;" therefore, the "special needs" examination in the
Ferguson case should also concentrate on the policy's "ultimate
goal."5
Despite the aforementioned reservations, Justice Kennedy agreed,
in the second part of his concurrence, that Policy M-7 had to be
struck down under the Fourth Amendment.57 He too cited the high
degree of law enforcement involvement as the distinguishing factor
not supported by the "special needs" line of cases.58 Justice
Kennedy went so far as to call the respondent hospital an
"institutional arm of law enforcement."59 Furthermore, Justice
Kennedy clearly expressed his view that the Ferguson holding was
limited to the facts of the instant case.6° Also, he reaffmned the
existence of a strong governmental interest in the health of unborn
children and the validity of some other various mandatory reporting
laws.
6 1
Finally, in the third part of his concurrence, Justice Kennedy
found significant the lack of a decision below on the issue of
consent.62 Justice Kennedy predicted that if consent had been at
issue, the case might have been resolved differently.6
53. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 86-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
56. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy compared the immediate goals with
the ultimate goals in Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656; and Acton, 515 U.S.
at 646, discussed infra. Id. at 87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
58. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
59. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 89 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 89-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy offers, as an example, laws
which require teachers to report suspected instances of child abuse. Id. at 90 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
62. Id. at 91 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
63. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 91 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy indicated that
"[an essential, distinguishing feature of the special needs cases is that the person searched
has consented, though the usual voluntariness analysis is altered because adverse
consequences . . . will follow from refusal." Id. at 90-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He
2002
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The lone dissent, written by Justice Scalia, quarrelled with even
the initial assumptions of the majority.64 To Scalia, it was not at all
clear that a search was at issue.A5 Justice Scalia argued that the
only conceivable search was the taking of the urine and, perhaps,
the testing of it.66 He stressed that these activities were not being
challenged so much as the non-searching act of handing the results
over to law enforcement officials.
67
Justice Scalia proceeded to delve into the consent issue passed
on by the majority.68 Because there was no evidence or contention
that the urine was procured by physical force, Justice Scalia
offered that only three other circumstances exist in which the urine
samples could be said to have been obtained without consent.69
Consent had to either be: (1) coerced by a general need for
medical treatment; (2) uninformed in that the patients were not
told of the intended testing; or (3) uninformed in that the patients
were not told that the police would become involved. 0
According to Justice Scalia, the latter two types of consent
would not even be considered deficient under Fourth Amendment
precedent. 71 He referred to a line of cases that suggest that "the
Fourth Amendment [does not protect] a wrongdoer's misplaced
belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his
wrongdoing will not reveal it."72 Justice Scalia contended that
Ferguson was the first time that the Court had suggested that the
police could not use incriminating evidence obtained after someone
voluntarily gave it up.73 Justice Scalia would have held "that
information obtained through violation of a relationship of trust is
claimed that the majority's assumption that the patients did not consent "erected a strange
world for deciding the case." Id. at 91 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
64. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). "What petitioners, the Court, and to a lesser extent the
concurrence really object to is not the urine testing, but the hospital's reporting of positive
drug-test results to police. But the latter is obviously not a search." Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
67. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Scalia, J., .dissenting).
70. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)).
The line of cases that Justice Scalia referred to is the Hoffa line, stemming from Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Those cases hold that a when
person voluntarily grants access to evidence, if the evidence in turn is obtained by law
enforcement, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Therefore,
violating someone's trust is not the same as a search. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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obtained consensually, and is hence not a search." 4 No other
justices joined in this first part of Justice Scalia's opinion.
In the second part of his dissent, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia reluctantly wrote
under the assumption that the taking and testing of the urine
constituted a warrantless nonconsensual search, making the special
needs doctrine relevant.75 Justice Scalia insisted that even if this
assumption was made, and the special needs doctrine were applied,
the so-called "searches" at issue should be found constitutional.76
Justice Scalia contended that the majority incorrectly viewed the
purported medical purposes of Policy M-7 as mere pretext to the
true motivations of law enforcement. 77 The majority was not
entitled to impose this view because the fact-finder had expressly
determined the purpose of Policy M-7 to be providing for the health
and drug treatment of mother and child.78 The dissenters found
significance in the fact that some testing had begun without law
enforcement influence or aid.79 Similarly, they were moved by the
fact that originally, a referral to treatment was the immediate (not
merely "ultimate") result of a positive drug screening.80 Justice
Scalia and his co-dissenters failed to perceive why, once the police
got involved, the majority believed that those original motives were
no longer an immediate purpose for the policy.81
The dissent asserted that no justification existed to distinguish
the instant situation from situations that require medical personnel
to report test results to law enforcement officials.8 2 Justice Scalia
wrote that the majority's holding necessarily means that virtually
any prosecutorial involvement renders the special needs doctrine
inapplicable8 Meanwhile, he claimed, the entire point of the
74. Id. at 96. See supra note 72.
75. Id. at 98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined
as to the second part of Justice Scalia's dissent. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 98-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia averred that "[t]his finding
is binding upon us unless clearly erroneous, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a). Not only do I
find it supportable; I think that any other finding would have to be overturned." Id. (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 99-100 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 100 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was referring to situations where
physicians come across possibly incriminating information quite inadvertently and are bound
by professional regulations and ethical codes to report the same. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
83. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 100 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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special needs doctrine is, in certain necessitous situations, to
"untie" the hands of law enforcement and allow their involvement.s4
In summary, the dissent maintained that law enforcement
presence did not invalidate the medical objectives of MUSC.85
Justice Scalia analogized the facts at hand to a case in which the
Court validated, under the special heeds doctrine, a warrantless
search by a probation officer who had received a tip that the
parolee possessed a gun.s6 In his final attempt to undercut the
majority's conclusion that law enforcement purposes dominated
Policy M-7 and its implementation, Justice Scalia directed attention
to the fact that only thirty of the 253 women who tested positive
under the policy were ever arrested, and only two were ever
prosecuted.87 .He concluded that this was not consistent with the
majority's finding that Policy M-7's "immediate purpose" was crime
control.8
The "special needs" doctrine at issue in Ferguson has its origins
in a concurring opinion authored by Justice Blackmun in New
Jersey v. TL.O. 9 In that case, a fourteen-year-old girl was caught
smoking cigarettes in her public school's bathroom.90 When she
later denied the event, a principal searched her purse and
discovered the cigarettes, a pipe, rolling papers, marijuana, and
various other evidence suggesting drug usage and dealing. 91 As a
result, the student was suspended and the State of New Jersey
brought delinquency charges against her.
92
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence uncovered by the
search of her purse.93 She alleged that the search was an
unconstitutional, warrantless, and unreasonable in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and that any evidence gathered therefrom was
inadmissible. 94 The Juvenile Court denied the motion, deemed the
84. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 100-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868 (1987). Justice Scalia summarized that in Griffin, in affirming a denial of a motion
to suppress, "[the.Court] concluded that the 'special need' of assuring compliance with terms
of release justified a warrantless search of petitioner's home." Id. at 100-01 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id. at 103 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 103-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
90. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
91. Id.
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search to be reasonable, and found the defendant delinquent.95
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court
affirmed the trial court's finding that the search was reasonable,
but the New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed, reversed, and
ordered suppression of the evidence.96 The State of New Jersey
sought review by the United States Supreme Court, and certiorari
was granted.97
TL.0 addressed whether searches by school officials required
either a search warrant or probable cause to be reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.98 The Court held that public school
officials are state actors subject to the Fourth Amendment's
prohibitions, and that school children do have a legitimate
expectation of privacy, even at school.99
The majority proceeded to apply a traditional balancing test,
weighing the privacy expectations of the school children against
the school's need to provide for a conducive learning
environment. I°° The majority concluded that the latter interest
outweighed the former, at least sufficiently enough to relax the
usual restrictions on searches by state authorities. 1'01 Rather than
imposing a probable cause standard, the Court held that public
schools must simply conduct searches in a manner reasonable
under all circumstances. 12 Applying this standard to the facts
before it, the Court ruled that the purse search was initiated and
conducted reasonably.
03
Concurring, Justice Blackmun expressed that the reasonableness
of most searches was not for judges to decide.1 4 In his view, the
framers of the Constitution had already balanced the considerations
and determined that most searches were reasonable only when
95. TL.0, 469 U.S. at 329-30.
96. Id. at 330-31.
97. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 464 U.S. 991 (1983).
98. TL.O, 469 U.S. at 328, 332. The Court had originally granted certiorari based on
an exclusionary rule issue, but later determined that more broad Fourth Amendment
considerations would have to be included to properly decide the case. Id. at 332.
99. Id. at 333-34.
100. Id. at 337-42.
101. Id. at 341. The Court stated:
We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in concluding that the
accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of
teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not
require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause
to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law.
Id.
102. Id.
103. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 343-47.
104. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
2002
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supported by a warrant and/or probable cause.105 Justice Blackmun
pronounced that "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in
which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is
a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of
the Framers."1°6 Rather than applying a traditional balancing test,
which he saw as unnecessary, Justice Blackmun would have held
that "[t]he elementary and secondary school setting presents a
special need for flexibility justifying a departure from the balance
struck by the Framers."10 7 He further explained that "[t]he special
need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either
the safety of schoolchildren and teachers or the educational
process itself justifies the Court in excepting school searches from
the warrant and probable cause requirement."'08 Hence, the "special
needs" terminology was first coined.' °9
Having only appeared in a concurring opinion, the special needs
doctrine was of limited precedential value following New Jersey v.
TL.O.110 The doctrine came one step closer to enjoying loftier
status as accepted law several years later in O'Connor v. Ortega."'
In Ortega, officials at a state hospital searched the office,
particularly the desk and filing cabinets, of a managing psychiatrist
suspected of some workplace wrongdoings."' The evidence
uncovered therefrom was used in administrative proceedings that
resulted in the physician's dismissal."3
The psychiatrist sued the officials responsible for the search,
alleging that the search was unreasonable and in violation of the
Fourth Amendment." 4  Both parties moved for summary
105. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
106. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
108. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 351-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun's concurrence, though
short (roughly three pages), made use of the "special needs" terminology three times. Id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
111. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
112. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 712-13. Specifically, Dr. Ortega was suspected of coercing
residents into contributing funds for a new computer, taking inappropriate disciplinary action
against a resident, and sexually harassing two female co-workers. Id. at 712.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 714. Dr. Ortega brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. This statute is
commonly known as The Civil Rights Act, and allows for a private right of action for
violation of federal rights. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225 (1972); and District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). The statute provides
that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
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judgment.115 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the hospital's motion, holding that the
search was proper, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed and found the search to be violative of the Fourth
Amendment."
6
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, found that the physician had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office, and particularly in his desk and filing
cabinets."7 What remained to be settled was the reasonableness of
the search." 8 The Court undertook a discussion indicating that the
reasonableness of a search depends upon its context, and therefore
can vary from workplace to workplace." 9 Again, the Court applied
a balancing test, weighing the employee's reasonable expectations
with the employer/government's need for supervision, control, and
efficient operation. 20 The Court reiterated that the standard needed
to be one of reasonableness under all circumstances. 2' In doing so,
Justice O'Connor quoted Justice Blackmun's concurrence in
TL.O.'2 The plurality ended its discussion by concluding that "the
'special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement make
the probable-cause requirement impracticable' for legitimate
work-related, noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations
of work-related misconduct."123 The Court disposed of the case by
ruling that summary judgment was improper and remanding the
case for further examination into the reasonableness of the
search.
24
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002).
115. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 714.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 718-19.
118. Id. at 719.
119. Id. at 719-21.
120. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 719-720. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
121. Id. at 725-26. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 725. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 728-29. On remand, the case went through a series of appeals back and
forth between the district court and the court of appeals, and a new trial. The defendants
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Because of the divisive implications of any holding supported
by a mere plurality, it would be inaccurate to say the special
needs doctrine was clearly adopted in Ortega.1 25 However, the
Ortega plurality's reiteration of the "special needs" terminology
foreshadowed what was soon to come.
26
Definitive adoption of the special needs doctrine came only a
few months after Ortega in Griffin v. Wisconsin.127 In Griffin, a
probation officer, acting on a tip from police and pursuant to a
probation regulation that merely required supervisor approval and
reasonable grounds for suspicion, searched a probationer's
apartment and discovered a handgun. 128 The probationer was
subsequently tried and convicted of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. 29 The trial court denied the probationer's motion
to suppress the evidence, concluding that no warrant was needed
and that the search was reasonable. 30 Both Wisconsin state courts
of appeal affirmed the conviction.'
3'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a
warrantless search of a probationer's residence violated the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.' 32  A
majority of the Court concluded that the "special needs" of a
probation system justified variance from the usual rule that a
search be supported by probable cause and/or a warrant. 1 3 The
Court reasoned that a probation program's need for rehabilitation,
supervision, protection of the community at large, and a quick
response time supported the departure.' 34 In its holding, the
majority again quoted Justice Blackmun's concurrence in TL.O.,
recognizing that "[a]lthough we usually require that a search be
undertaken only pursuant to a warrant, . . . we have permitted
exceptions when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law
were eventually found liable, and the decision was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, seventeen years after the initial search. Ortega v. O'Connor, 146 F3d 1149 (9th Cir.
1998).
125. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 711. A plurality opinion is "[a]n opinion lacking enough
judges' votes to constitute a majority, but receiving more votes than any other opinion."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1119 (7th ed. 1999).
126. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 725.
127. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 868.
128. Id. at 870-71. Petitioner Joseph Griffin was on probation after being convicted of
resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and obstructing an officer. Id. at 870.
129. Id. at 872. This crime was codified at Wis. STAT. § 941.29(2) (1985-1986). Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 479 U.S. 1005 (1986).
133. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74. See supra note 86.
134. Id. at 873-77.
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enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable.'"135 The special needs doctrine was thereby officially
and definitively adopted by a majority of the Court.136
Since Griffin, four Supreme Court cases have considered the
application of the special needs doctrine to warrantless drug testing
situations comparable to that of Ferguson.137 The first two, Skinner
v. Railway Executives' Ass'n and National Treasury Employees v.
Von Raab, were argued and decided in tandem.138
In Skinner, the Court upheld a Federal Railroad Administration
regulation that allowed suspicionless drug testing of railroad
employees. 139 The "special need" cited by the majority in its
approval of the policy was the government's interest in ensuring
public safety.140 Quoting Griffin, the majority held that:
The Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad
employees to ensure safety, like its supervision of
probationers or regulated industries, or its operation of a
government office, school or prison, "likewise presents 'special
needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify
departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause
requirements.
" 141
Furthermore, the testing passed Fourth Amendment muster
because the industry was already highly regulated for safety
reasons, so employees should already have had a diminished
expectation of privacy.142 In this case, not even the lack of
individualized suspicion was enough to make the search
unreasonable. 143
Argued and decided on the same day as Skinner was National
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab.1  In Von Raab, the Court
135. Id. at 873 (quoting TL.O., 469 U.S. ht 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
136. Id.
137. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656; Acton, 515 U.S. at 646;
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 305.
138. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656.
139. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
140. Id. at 628. The majority of the Court explained that "[e]mployees subject to the
tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that eve n a momentary
lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences." Id.
141. Id. at 620.
142. Id. at 627.
143. Id. at 624. The majority noted, "[wie made it clear . . . that a showing of
individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be
presumed unreasonable." Id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61
(1976)).
144. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656.
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"granted certiorari to decide whether it violates the Fourth
Amendment for the United States Customs Service to require a
urinalysis test from employees who seek transfer or promotion to
certain positions."' 45 The positions referred to required the
employee to either carry a gun, handle classified materials, or
become directly involved in drug interdiction. 14 Through their
employment union, some of these employees sued, alleging that the
policy violated the Fourth Amendment because it did not contain
any requirement of suspicion or probable cause.
147
The Court concluded that the drug testing constituted a
reasonable search because "the Government has a compelling
interest in ensuring that front line interdiction personnel are
physically fit and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment."'4
The majority also cited, as a "special need," the risk to the life of
the citizenry posed by potential use of deadly force by persons
suffering from impaired perception and judgment due to drug
use.49 According to the majority, these "special needs" outweighed
the expectations of privacy that any such employee could
legitimately have as a servant of a governmental law enforcement
agency.11 For the second time that day, the Court asserted that:
[O]ur cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment
intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance
the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's
interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the
particular context.
15'
The Customs Service policy was upheld. 152
Five years later, the Court revisited and further developed the
special needs doctrine in the context of drug testing in Vernonia
School Dist. 47J v. Acton.'- This time, the setting was a state
school district that had adopted a random drug testing policy for
student athletes.154 Having discovered some drug use among its
145. Id. at 659.
146. Id. at 660-61.
147. Id. at 663.
148. Id. at 670.
149. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671.
150. Id. at 671-72.
151. Id. at 665-66.
152. Id. at 679.
153. Acton, 515 U.S. at 646.
154. Id. at 648.
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student athletes (through some students' own admissions), the
school authorized random urinalysis drug tests of any student
member of the school's athletic teams. 155 One student, who refused
testing and therefore was prevented from joining the football team,
sued the school district contending that the searches were
suspicionless and unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.'-'
Continuing its expansion of the special needs doctrine, the Court
ruled that the "special needs" of deterring schoolchildren from drug
use outweighed an individual student's interest in privacy.15 7 Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia noted that "[a] search unsupported
by probable cause can be constitutional."158 He quoted the familiar
special needs language from Griffin, specifically indicating that
"special needs" are particularly apt to exist in the public-school
arena. 59 Thus, another form of suspicionless drug testing was held
to be constitutional under the special needs doctrine under the
Fourth Amendment.16°
The Supreme Court's last word, preceding Ferguson, concerning
warrantless drug testing and the special needs doctrine came in
1997 in Chandler v. Miller.161 Georgia had enacted a statute
requiring candidates for certain state offices to undergo, or certify
that they had recently undergone, urinalysis drug testing before
election and appointment.162 Some nominees brought suit against
the Governor and two other officials, alleging a Fourth Amendment
violation. 161 The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals both relied on the
Supreme Court's "special needs" precedents and determined that
the drug tests were valid under the Fourth Amendment.
t 4
When the case came before the Supreme Court, the majority of
the justices concluded, for the first time in the "special needs" line,
that a state sponsored suspicionless drug testing policy was not
justified by the government's purported "special needs."'6 The
155. Id. at 648-50.
156. Id. at 651.
157. Id. at 664-65. The Court stated: "Taking into account all the factors we have
considered above - the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of
the search, and the severity of the need met by the search - we conclude that Vernonia's
Policy is reasonable and hence constitutional." Id.
158. Acton, 515 U.S. at 653.
159. Id. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
160. Id. at 664-65.
161. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 305.
162. Id. at 309.
163. Id. at 310.
164. Id. at 311-12.
165. Id. at 322. In full, the Court remarked, "[tihe need revealed, in short, is symbolic,
2002
Duquesne Law Review
Court held that "[n]o precedent suggest[s] that a State's power to
establish qualifications for state offices . . . diminishes the
constraints on state action imposed by the Fourth Amendment."'6
Though the Court opined that the intrusion on the individual
candidates' privacy was relatively minor, it claimed that Georgia
failed to demonstrate any special needs substantial enough to
justify variance from the usual Fourth Amendment requirement of
some individualized suspicion.167
In making its determination, the Court was influenced by the
state's total lack of suspicion of the class in general. 16 It
distinguished Chandler from Von Raab, Skinner and Acton on the
basis that Georgia had absolutely no evidence of drug abuse among
its elected officials. 169 In fact, Georgia readily admitted in its oral
argument that the statute was not a response to any specific
suspicion or fear.170 The Court called Georgia's purported needs
"symbolic, not 'special.'"17 As a result, the majority opinion was
devoted to clarifying that "special needs" are found only in unique
circumstances.1 72 The statute was struck down as violative of, and
unreasonable under, the Fourth Amendment.'73
After examining the Court's holding in Ferguson, placing the
decision in context with the cases which preceded Ferguson
(particularly Chandler), it is clear that, presently, the Supreme
Court has moved towards limiting the application of the special
needs doctrine as it is applied to drug tests lacking the support of
a warrant or probable cause. Having expanded the doctrine for
over ten years, the Court in its past two reviews of the doctrine
has identified Fourth Amendment violations. 74 Notably, these were
first two times the Court has done so in the history of the
doctrine's application to drug testing.
not 'special,' as that term draws meaning from our case law." Id.
166. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 317.
167. Id. at 318.
168. Id. at 318-19. The Court observed that "[n]otably lacking in respondents'
presentation is any indication of a concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth
Amendment's main rule. Nothing in the record hints that the hazards respondents broadly
describe are real and not simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity." Id.
169. Id. at 319.
170. Id.
171. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322. See supra note 165.
172. Id. at 318. The Court noted: "Our precedents establish that the proffered special
need for drug testing must be substantial - important enough to override the individual's
acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal
requirement of individualized suspicion." Id.
173. Id. at 323.
174. See Chandler and Ferguson, discussed supra.
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In any event, it is difficult to argue with the result of Ferguson.
The privacy expectations of the affected mothers were largely
ignored, particularly in light of the physician-patient relationship.
175
This situation was not akin to one in which medical personnel
inadvertently discover drug use through a urinalysis test taken for
independent treatment purposes, and are bound by ethical rules
and mandatory reporting laws to report the same. In fact, the Court
deliberately took the time to verify that such mandatory reporting
laws and actions undertaken thereto remain valid.
176
The stance taken by the Supreme Court in Ferguson should also
not be shocking considering the magnitude of police involvement.
As the Court itself seemed to recognize, this is the strongest
footing on which the decision stands.' 77 In fact, if not for the
extensive role that law enforcement played in the scheme, the
Court could quite easily have ruled the other way, finding that
weaning pregnant women from drugs was a valid "special need"
entitled to relaxed Fourth Amendment search restrictions.
It is difficult to understand how curbing the drug use of pregnant
women is any less "special" than curbing the drug use of high
school students.1 8 In either case, the "special need" is arguably the
health and well being of children. However, because of the extreme
nature of the law enforcement involvement in Ferguson, the Court
was able to draw a line and flag a situation that exceeded the
special needs doctrine's allowances. The Court wisely used this
opportunity to impose a limit on the expanding special needs
doctrine, though at the same time leaving some room to distinguish
175. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78. See supra note 42.
176. Id. at 78 n.13. The Court commented:
There are some circumstances in which state hospital employees, like other citizens,
may have a duty to provide law enforcement officials with evidence of criminal
conduct acquired in the course of routine treatment ... While the existence of such
laws might lead a patient to expect that members of the hospital staff might turn over
evidence acquired in the course of treatment to which the patient had consented, they
surely would not lead a patient to anticipate that hospital staff would intentionally set
out to obtain incriminating evidence from their patients for law enforcement purposes.
Id.
177. Id. at 79-80. The Court indicated that:
[tihe critical difference between those four drug-testing cases and this one, however,
lies in the nature of the "special need" asserted in justification for the warrantless
searches. In each of those earlier cases, the "special need" that was advanced as a
justification for the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion was one divorced
from the State's general interest in law enforcement . . . In this case, however, the
central and indispensable feature of the policy from its inception was the use of law
enforcement to coerce patients into substance abuse treatment.
Id.
178. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 646 and TL.O., 469 U.S. at 325.
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with respect to future "special needs" cases where police
involvement may not be so extensive. Perhaps the fact pattern and
timing of Ferguson was simply ideal for exacting such a limit.
Distinguishing future cases from Ferguson is certainly plausible.
The opinion will also likely prove to be correct in its practical
effects. The holding may well do more to achieve the "ultimate"
goals of Policy M-7 (care of mother and child, as opposed to what
the Court found to be its "immediate goal" of law enforcement)
than Policy M-7 itself. Some, possibly even the Court, would argue
that a ruling in favor of Policy M-7 would have actually been
injurious to the health and welfare of drug-abusing mothers and
their babies.179 That argument would contend that upholding the
tactics employed by MUSC would have actually discouraged
drug-using mothers from seeking prenatal treatment at all. 180 Such a
result would obviously not be beneficial to any party, including law
enforcement (because then drug-use would have to be discovered
by other means). In addition, few would argue that a prison is the
proper environment for mother or child.181 Additionally, others
179. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78-79 n.14. The majority commented that "we have
previously recognized that an intrusion on [the expectation of privacy of hospital patients]
may have adverse consequences because it may deter patients from receiving needed
medical care." Id. (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)). See also Jean R.
Schroedel & Pamela Fiber, Punitive Versus Public Health Oriented Responses to Drug Use
by Pregnant Women, 1 YALE J. OF HEALTH POL'Y, L AND Emics 217, 220 (2001). The authors
observed: "Critics charge the test and arrest approach followed in Charleston is both bad law
and ineffective public policy. Forcing doctors at public hospital to participate in the policy
violates the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship and threatens the
reproductive freedom of women." Id. (citing Carmen Vaughn, Circumventing the Fourth
Amendment via the Special Needs Doctrine to Prosecute Pregnant Drug Users: Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 51 S.C. L. REv. 857 (2000)). The article further states, "[m]oreover, critics
argue that pregnant users will avoid seeking prenatal care out of fear of prosecution." Id.
(citing Jean R. Schroedel, Is THE FETuS A PERSON? A COMPARISON OF PoucIEs ACROSS THE FnrY
STATES 102 (2000); and American Medical Association Board of Trustees Report, Legal
Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatment and Legal Penalties for
Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2667 (1990)). See also
Brody & McMillan, supra note 17, at 254. The authors proclaim:
As with many other state policies aimed at protecting an unborn child, the mandatory
reporting requirements tend to have acutely negative consequences to both the mother
and the fetus. If a pregnant drug-dependent woman is afraid that her doctor will learn
about her drug usage and report it, chances are good that she will simply avoid
seeking the prenatal care that is vital to her giving birth to a healthy baby.
Additionally, even if she does seek medical care, she is not likely to inform her doctor
of her drug use for fear of punishment or the removal of her children stemming from
state-mandated reporting.
Id. (citing Barry M. Lester et al., Keeping Mothers and Their Infants Together: Barriers and
Solutions, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L & Soc. CHANGE 425, 434 (1996); and D.A. Frank et al., Cocaine
Use During Pregnancy: Prevalence and Correlates, 82 PEDIATRICS 888, 888-95 (1988)).
180. Schroedel & Fiber, supra note 179.
181. One article contends that "incarceration actually works against the goal of
Ferguson v. City of Charleston
would argue that the policy could have been struck down on
discriminatory grounds.
182
Certainly for hospitals, the Ferguson case requires an evaluation
of any similar policies. First, importantly, the extent and degree of
law enforcement participation will have to be examined. But more
significantly, though perhaps more subtly, courts and affected
parties should interpret Ferguson to require scrutiny of future
non-law enforcement state drug testing scenarios from a motive
perspective. As noted, the Court could have easily been swayed to
an opposite decision had it been convinced that the primary
purpose for the search was the treatment of mother and child,
rather than law enforcement. It must be remembered that since its
inception, the special needs doctrine, despite its abbreviated name,
has been about more than just special needs; it has been about
non-law enforcement special needs.
Nicholas J. Zidik
improving fetal health." Schroedel & Fiber, supra note 179, at 220. The article explains:
Correctional institutions in the United States have not adopted the guidelines for
minimum obstetrical and gynecological care promulgated by the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, or any of the relevant medical associations. The
American Medical Association, American Academy of Pediatrics, American Nurses
Association, American Public Health Association, and American Society of Addiction
Medicine, have all issued statements opposing the incarceration of pregnant addicts.
Id. at n.27. (citing Punishing Women for Their Behavior, A Public Health Disaster, 5-6 (on
file with author)). The article also adds that "less than half of state prisons for women have
policies governing the care of pregnant addicts. To make matters worse, drugs are widely
available in prisons and jails." Id. (citing Charles G. Egley et al., Outcome of Pregnancy
During Imprisonment, 37 J. REPROD. MED. 131, 132 (1992); and Janet S. Wilson & Renee
Leasure, Cruet and Unusual Punishment: The Health Care of Women in Prison, 16 NURsE
PRAc. 32, 35 (1991)).
182. Debatably, "[t]he policy discriminates against poor and minority women because
they are more likely to visit a state hospital than a private hospital." Schroedel & Fiber,
supra note 179, at 220.
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